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ABSTRACT 
In a well-known paper, Rosalind Hursthouse argues that certain common, and not irrational, 
actions cannot be accommodated by the dominant philosophical model of the rational 
explanation of action. Although there is no rational explanation, she claims, there is a good 
explanation for such action: they are done out of emotion. In this paper I argue that we can reject 
+XUVWKRXVH¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDWH[SODQDWLRQRIDFWLRQDVWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIHPRWLRQLVVXLJHQHULVLI
we have a sufficiently broad understanding of how features can count in favour of actions. What 
is distinctive about expressive acts, I will argue, is not that they are spontaneous products of the 
µRYHUIORZLQJRISRZHUIXOIHHOLQJ¶UHTXLULQJDIRUPRIH[SODQDWLRQWKDWLVDUDWLRQDOEXWUDWKHU
that they are done intentionally but for their own sake as a constitutive part of doing justice to 
RQH¶VVHQVHRIWKHJUDYLW\RULQGHHGOHYLW\RIDVLWXDWLRQ7KHDFWLRQLVQRWDUDWLRQDOEXWFDQEH
assessed for its expressive adequacy. Furthermore, the expressive action, on this view, has a 
purpose ± WKDWRIGRLQJMXVWLFHRUJLYLQJDGHTXDWHH[WHUQDOIRUPWRRQH¶VVHQVHRIWKHVLWXDWLRQ
If there are reasons sometimes simply to acknowledge or honour the gravity of a situation then 
we can reconcile expressive action with the standard picture of rational explanation of action. 
 
KEYWORDS: EXPRESSION; EMOTION; ACTION; INTENTION; PRACTICAL RATIONALITY; 
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE; SYMBOLISM 
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1. Introduction+XUVWKRXVH¶VSX]]OH 
In a well-known paper, Rosalind Hursthouse argues that certain common, and not irrational, 
actions cannot be accommodated by the dominant philosophical model of the rational 
explanation of action (Hursthouse 1991). Examples of the category Hursthouse has in mind 
would includeUXPSOLQJVRPHRQH¶VKDLURXWRIDIIHFWLRQRUWHQGHUQHVVMumping in joy or 
H[FLWHPHQWGHVWUR\LQJVRPHWKLQJFRQQHFWHGZLWKDSDUWLFXODUSHUVRQLQDQJHUFRYHULQJRQH¶V
face (in the dark) from shame or fear; µpuffing oneself up¶ with pride; caressing the clothes of a 
loved one in grief.  
 
+XUVWKRXVH¶VFODLPLVWKDt 1) these are examples of actions, since they are intentional rather than 
merely involuntary reflexes (the agent is in some way in rational control of the way she acts), 2) 
VXFKEHKDYLRXULVQRWLUUDWLRQDOEXWWKH\DUHQRWGRQH³IRUDUHDVRQ´LQWKHVense that there is 
something that the agent takes as counting in favour of acting thus.1 It is not the case that, in 
jumping for joy as the ball goes in the net, I am doing so because I believe that this will bring 
about a state of affairs towards which I have some pro-attitude.2 On these grounds, she thinks, 
these actions cannot be accommodated by the dominant model of rational explanation of action, 
ZKHUHDFWLRQVDUHH[SODLQHGE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHSXUSRVHWKHDJHQWKDGLQVRDFWLQJ6KHGRHVQ¶W
question the validity of that model, and therefore terms these actions µarational.¶ But although 
there is no rational explanation, she claims, there is a good explanation for this action: it was 
done out of joy (and behaviour like that is within the normal range of behaviour to which joy 
                                                 
1
 Drawing on a McDowellian formulation, Hursthouse says that there is no description of such action that will reveal 
WKH³IDYRXUDEOHOLJKWLQZKLFKWKHDJHQWVDZZKDWKHGLG´RQWKe assumption that, to explain action through reasons 
is precisely to reveal the good that the agent saw in the action).  
2
 &I'DYLGVRQ³5LVDSULPDU\UHDVRQZK\DQDJHQWSHUIRUPHGWKHDFWLRQ$XQGHUWKHGHVFULSWLRQGRQO\LI5
consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under 
WKHGHVFULSWLRQGKDVWKDWSURSHUW\´(Davidson 1980: 5). 
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leads). She argues that the way we explain these actions, which the dominant model cannot 
accommodate, is by seeing them as expressions of emotion. Explaining action as the expression 
of emotion, however, is a quite different kind of explanation of action from what she takes to be 
the standard form of rational explanation in which we explain action by citing some feature that 
an agent took to count in favour of the action. 
 
,QWKLVSDSHU,DUJXHWKDWZHFDQUHMHFW+XUVWKRXVH¶VFRQFOXVLon that explanation of action as the 
expression of emotion is sui generis if we have a sufficiently broad understanding of how 
features can count in favour of actions. In what follows, I will not question her assumption that 
the standard form of rational explanation of action involves citing some feature counting in 
favour of the action to which the agent was responding in so acting. What is distinctive about 
H[SUHVVLYHDFWV,ZLOODUJXHLVQRWWKDWWKH\DUHVSRQWDQHRXVSURGXFWVRIWKHµRYHUIORZLQJRI
powHUIXOIHHOLQJ¶UHTXLULQJDIRUPRIH[SODQDWLRQWKDWLVDUDWLRQDOEXWUDWKHUWKDWWKH\DUHGRQH
intentionally but for their own sake DVDFRQVWLWXWLYHSDUWRIGRLQJMXVWLFHWRRQH¶VVHQVHRIWKH
gravity (or indeed levity) of a situation. One ruffles the cKLOG¶VKDLULQRUGHUWRgive form, on this 
YLHZWRRQH¶VVHQVHRIWKHDIIHFWLRQ-ZRUWKLQHVVRIWKHFKLOGJLYHQQRGRXEWRQH¶VUHODWLRQWR
WKHFKLOGDVZHOODVWKHFKLOG¶VLQWULQVLFIHDWXUHV7KHDFWLRQLVQRWDUDWLRQDOEXWFDQEHDVVHVVHG
for its expressive adequacy. Furthermore, the expressive action, on this view, has a purpose ± 
that of doing justice, or giving adequate external IRUPWRRQH¶VVHQVHRIWKHVLWXDWLRQ%XWDWWKH
same time, the claim that these are actions done for their own sake ± in the sense that nothing 
IXUWKHULVDFKLHYHGE\µGRLQJMXVWLFHWR¶RUµFDSWXULQJ¶RUµHPERG\LQJLQDFWLRQ¶WKHJUDYLW\RIWKH
situation, that these actions are not done as a means to a further end ± means that we can 
diagnose the tendency to see these actionVDVµQRWGRQHIRUDUHDVRQ¶,IRQHWDNHVLWWKDWDOO
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reasons are means-end reasons then it will indeed look as though there are no reasons for the 
kind of acts in question. But if there are reasons sometimes simply to acknowledge or honour the 
gravity of a situation then we can reconcile expressive action with the standard picture of rational 
explanation of action (for an alternative view, see Helm, this volume).   
 
Of course, it will remain true that many manifestations of emotion remain immune to rational 
explanation. As Hursthouse notes, we can talk about various such manifestations, including the 
following: phenomena like blushing, sweating and so on, which may betray the presence of 
underlying emotional states and which seem beyond any voluntary or rational control; forms of 
behaviour like smiling, which often occur involuntarily, but which it is possible to stop or to 
suppress; and the apparently fully intentional actions that she is most centrally concerned with. 
How far rational explanation extends down this scale remains for further research to determine: it 
will depend on a more developed theory of the sensitivity of the human body and its behaviour to 
rational considerations than I have to offer here. However, many types of apparently instinctive 
behaviour can in fact be better understood as habitual, learned behaviour, so where the line is to 
be drawn would require careful investigation. Furthermore, as will become apparent further on in 
WKHSDSHU,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWWKHaccount I give here explains all behaviour out of emotion, or 
covers all the emotions. Rather, a guiding thought in this paper is that while some emotions and 
their manifestations have as their purpose the strategic role of preserving the organism and 
alerting it to threats or opportunities in its environment (which may be the best explanation of 
fear, for instance), others have the role of picking out significant events from the otherwise 
fleeting play of consciousness, and making them reVRQDWHLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VOLIHWKXVSURYLGing 
the agent with the sense of the inherent importance of these events (think rather of guilt and 
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shame). The role of some emotions, in other words, is that of marking or acknowledging, rather 
than protecting and promoting. If this is correct, then we would expect the resonance to go quite 
deep, to be felt and manifested bodily in ways that the individual cannot easily control. It is this 
category of the emotionally expressive ± associated with resonance, which seems non-purposive, 
and which for that reason Hursthouse and others have found puzzling ± that I am interested in 
here. 
 
2. How could we see expressive actions as carried out for a reason? 
+XUVWKRXVH¶VDUJXPHQWKDVKDGLWVFULWLFVQRWMXVWEHFDXVHLWVHHPVWRVXJJHVWWKDWPXFKRI
human behaviour lies outside the scope of rational explanation, but because it casts doubt on the 
assumption that intentional action is action that can be explained in terms of reasons.3 As Betzler 
puts it:  
 
³DFWLRQVWKDWDUHLQWHQWLRQDOEXWQRWGRQHIRUDSDUWLFXODUUHDVRn (and therefore not carried 
out because they have brought about something good or valuable) are a puzzle. They 
FRXQWDVDFWLRQVLQRQHUHVSHFWEXWIDLOWRGRVRLQDQRWKHU7KH\DUHXQGHUWKHDJHQW¶V
FRQWURO\HWQRWLQWHOOLJLEOHIURPWKHDJHQW¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ´ (Betzler 2009: 273)  
 
7RRYHUFRPH+XUVWKRXVH¶VDUJXPHQWDZHFRXOGGHQ\WKDWWKLVEHKDYLRXULVPRUHWKDQUHIOH[RU
b) we could argue that it is simply irrational; or c) we could deny that there is no rational 
explanation for it (i.e. we could deny that there is no way of explaining it as done for a reason).  
$OWHUQDWLYHO\GRQHPLJKWWU\D³GLYLGH-and-UXOH´VWUDWHJ\DUJXLQJWKDWVRPHRI+XUVWKRXVH¶V
H[DPSOHVVD\WKRVHGHDOLQJZLWKDQJHUMR\DQGRWKHU³YLROHQW´HPRWLRQVIDOOLQWRWKHUHIOH[
                                                 
3
 See for example, Smith 1998; Raz 1999; Goldie 2000; Döring 2003; Betzler 2009.  
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FDWHJRU\ZKLOHWKRVHWKDWDUHPRUHOLNHVD\UXPSOLQJKDLURUFDUHVVLQJDGHDGRQH¶VFORWKHVDUH
done for the sake of some expected good. I think it is fruitless to try to deny that the behaviour in 
question is action, since although much of it might be impulsive, it is not involuntary: while there 
may be some cases of expressive action in which questions may be raised about the extent of our 
control over our action (Raz 1999: 38-42)WKLVLVQRWWKHFDVHHJZLWKUXIIOLQJWKHFKLOG¶VKDLU
out of affection. Furthermore, it seems plausible to think that much of this behaviour is not 
simply hard-wired but learned (and hence culturally variable: think of the different ways in 
which men and women learn to express joy: punching the air and yelling is pretty masculine: cf 
Raz 1999: 41). Could we argue that these actions are irrational? Some of them might be, as when 
a fit of temper makes one harm or destroy the thing one loves. However, there are many of these 
actions that, other things being equal, are not contrary to what one has reason to do (though they 
can be contrary to reason in certain circumstances, or when the expression takes a particular 
form). Hursthouse seems right to say that these actions are not simply irrational simply by virtue 
of being in the category she is interested in, that is, the category of expressive actions.  
 
However, there might seem to be an obvious way of explaining how these actions could be 
supported by reason (Smith 1997: 22). After all, the agent clearly acts on certain desires ± to 
jump in the air; to destroy everything in the room that belongs to that unspeakable --; to cover 
RQHVHOIXSWRWRXFKWKHORYHGRQH¶V clothes ± and the action comes about because the agent 
believes that moving her body in certain ways will bring it about that she jumps in the air, 
destroys everything that belongs to him, etc.. Here we have identified something that the agent 
saw as counting in favour of the action: that, given her desire to X, moving her body in certain 
ways would count as X-ing. However, the problem with this response as a solution to the puzzle 
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LVWKDWWKLVNLQGRIH[SODQDWLRQZRXOGQRWUHDOO\H[SODLQDQ\WKLQJFHUWDLQO\LWZRXOGQ¶WEHDJRRG
explanation of the sort that we want when, say, in holding someone to account, we explain 
human behaviour in terms of reasons.4 The explanation does not bring an end to our questions, it 
simply makes us ask, why GLGVKHZDQWWRMXPSGHVWUR\HWF"+XUVWKRXVH¶VSUREOHPVWHPVIURP
the fact that this minimal response provides no good answer to that.  
 
Another way in which one might try to show the rationality of these actions is by trying to find 
some more intelligible human purpose that could be served by expressive actions, something else 
that these actions are performed in order to bring about. We could do this by saying that one acts 
thus in order to express the emotion. This could be interpreted in two ways: a) that one acts in 
order to relieve or vent the emotion, to achieve a kind of satisfaction or psychological 
equilibrium; or b) that one aFWVLQRUGHUWRPDNHRQH¶VPHQWDOVWDWHNQRZQto some other party or 
parties. However, neither of these ways of rationalising expressive behaviour seems right. 
Expressive behaviour is engaged in in some sense for its own sake. It is not primarily a technique 
that we employ to restore psychological balance or to communicate with others (though of 
course, those things may be foreseen effects of the expressive action).5  
 
However, IURPWKHVHIDLOHGVROXWLRQVWR+XUVWKRXVH¶VSX]]OH, we can begin to see room for an 
alternative solution. For it is not an entirely unfamiliar thought in normative ethics that some 
actions might indeed be LQKHUHQWO\µILWWLQJ¶DQGgood for their own sake: obviously being good 
                                                 
4
 Smith himself notes WKDWWKLVH[SODQDWLRQZRXOGEH³GLVWLQFWO\XQVDWLVI\LQJ´DQGFODLPVWKDWWKH+XPHDQDFFRXQW
underpinning it must ± and legitimately can ± be supplemented by reference to the emotion (Smith 1997: 22). 
5
 The communicative view can be given a further twist if it is interpreted as the view that, although the 
communication is not carried out intentionally, the aim of communication nevertheless explains why we act as we 
do, for instance if we see expressive behavior as evolved signaling behavior which informs others of our attitudes 
*UHHQ*UHHQ¶VYLHZLVDVRSKLVWLFDWHGYHUVLRQRIDYLHZ,ZLOOFRQVLGHUEHORZKRZHYHULWGRHVQRWKHOSWR
answer the question Hursthouse raises of how we can rationalize expressive action by citing some consideration that 
the agent took as counting in favour of so acting, which is what I am considering in this section. 
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for their own sake would be what counts in favour of those actions (cf. Cupit 1996; and the 
µH[SUHVVLYHWKHRU\RISUDFWLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\¶FDQYDVVHGLQ$QGHUVRQ. Of course, this idea 
needs further explanation. But if there are such acts, we can then ask to what extent her examples 
of action out of emotion can be understood as responsive to such reasons, for instance, by seeing 
them as spontaneous and intuitive instances of acts done for their own sake. I will now start to 
explore a sense of expressive action that does point to there being such reasons: reasons that 
support our deliberations about how to give form to our sense of what is important in a situation. 
 
3. ([SUHVVLYHDFWLRQDVµGRLQJMXVWLFH¶ 
At this point I will introduce an example the personal nature of which I hope will not serve as a 
distraction. DXULQJWKHSUHSDUDWLRQVIRUP\JUDQGIDWKHU¶VIXQHUDOWKHIXQHUDOGLUHFWRUUDLVHGWKH
question whether my brothers and I would carry the coffin, or whether he should get some of his 
staff to do it. We thought it over and decided we would do it. Since that time, I have wondered 
what reasons guided our choice and whether we made the right decision. Let me run through 
some candidates and briefly comment, not just on the likelihood that those were the reasons on 
which we acted, but rather on their normative weight, and the extent to which they support our 
decision. 
 
One thing that may have guided our decision is simply a sense that that is the done thing at these 
events, and that we did not want to be out of line with the done thing. We will come back to this 
sort of consideration below, but as specified these reasons are not very strong. Without some 
sense of why this is the done thing, or what is important about doing the done thing, this looks 
like mere conformity. 
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One way to flesh out the importance of doing the done thing would be to say something about 
the importance of tradition and ritual, particularly rituals that have remained as they are for 
hundreds of years. It might be said that there is some importance in the continuity achieved by 
carrying on in thHZD\WKDWSHRSOHLQRQH¶VFXOWXUHDFWLQWKHVHVLWXDWLRQVDQGKDYHDFWHGVLQFHLQ
doing so one is connecting oneself to a community dispersed in time and space. 
 
Another way to explain the importance of doing the done thing has a more local normative 
source, namely, in the desires and expectations of those attending the funeral, particularly my 
mother whose father it was; or in general wider social expectations. There is no doubt that this 
was a significant consideration weighing with us - and a good reason. However, although we 
PD\KDYHGRQHLWLQSDUWIRURXUPRWKHU¶VVDNHWKHUHLVVWLOODTXHVWLRQRIZKDWPDNHVWKLVDJRRG
reason. We did it, let us say, in part because we took it that her unspoken wish would have been 
that we did so. But why did she so wish? Was this wish reasonable? We certainly would have 
done a number of bizarre things for her - up to a point - RQWKDWGD\EXWWKLVZDVQ¶WRQHRIWKHP
For her to wish that we should carry the coffin seemed quite natural, not at all bizarre. We shared 
in her sense that this was the right and appropriate thing to do. Saying that we did it for my 
PRWKHU¶VVDNHGRHVQ¶WH[SODLQWKHEDVLVRIWKLVVHQVH 
 
As well as these considerations, we might also have done it for two other reasons that have 
become familiar through the course of our discussion: either to achieve psychological harmony 
by letting some pent-up inner states express themselves; or in order to communicate some 
attitude to others.  
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Taking the second, which seems the more plausible, we could sketch the following sort of social 
psychological story. The reason we carry the coffin is because we want to communicate 
something to others and this is the conventional vehicle (the done thing) by which to do so. What 
is it that we want to communicate? And why is it important to us to communicate it? It might be 
said that we want to communicate either something about our grandfather, or, to delve more 
deeply into our psychology, something about our membership of a particular social group (that, 
to paraphrase Erving Goffman, we act so as to reassure people that we can be counted on to 
behave as we are expected to: Goffman 1971). Why is it important to us to communicate such a 
thing? On the view that we communicate something about our grandfather, we might do so with 
the intention of receiving support and confirmation from others. On the social psychological 
view, we might develop the story to include an account of how the reason for much social 
behaviour is the maintenance of relations of trust, and that this requires the constant affirmation 
and re-DIILUPDWLRQRIRQH¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRSOD\RQH¶VUROHLQWKHJURXSDQGVSHFLILFDOO\LQVRPH
VWRULHVWRSOD\RQH¶VUROHZKROHKHDUWHGO\HYHQZKHQRQH¶VLQWHUHVWVPLJKWEHEHWWHUVHUYHGE\
breaking key social rules).   
 
However, it seems as though one reason that we might have had for deciding to carry the coffin 
LVQ¶WFDSWXUHGE\DQ\RIWKHVHUHDVRQV7KLVLVWKDWGRLQJVRPLJKWEHDQLPSRUWDQWZD\WRKRQRXU
the departed. The interpretations of our action that we have just canvassed above all seek to 
identify some purpose we seek to achieve in carrying the coffin, some end to which this action is 
the contingently most effective means. This seems to leave out the thought that this act is one 
that appeared to us as intrinsically fitting to the situation. Now when a theorist claims that 
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VRPHWKLQJLV³LQWULQVLFDOO\ILWWLQJ´WKHVXVSLFLRQPLJKWEHUDLVHGWKDWWKH\DUHVLPSO\UHIXVLQJWR
engage in any further argument or justification of their position. However, I think justification 
can be given, but simply not justification that explains how the act was a contingently effective 
means to a further end. The main motivation, I am thinking, is the desire to do justice to the 
importance of our loss. The interpretations we have looked at above see the act as being 
addressed at, or done for the sake of, someone or something other than our grandfather. Of 
course there are many functions of, and interests to be served, in a social form as rich as that of 
the funeral. But surely one natural thought might be that the staging of the funeral and the 
various components one decides to include within the ceremony have as at least part of their 
focus the person who has died, and that the justification of these actions should have something 
to do with that person. That is what would be meant by seeing these acts as an expression of, or 
YHKLFOHIRURQH¶VJULHI for the loss of that person. One way of interpreting the decision to carry 
the coffin would therefore be this: that one weighty reason in favour of carrying it has to do with 
the suitability of that act as a way of capturing or reflecting something of what our grandfather 
had meant to us, and that as a consequence deciding not to do it might be something that we 
would regret. 
 
In other words, one possibility is that we interpret the action as aimed at capturing or reflecting 
something about the situation we are in, namely, the loss of someone important to us, and this is 
not done as a means to a further end but for its own sake. Can we say something about what 
makes carrying the coffin an appropriate vehicle for grief? I think we can make some headway ± 
and in doing so we are unpacking or articulating the normative connection (of fittingness) 
between our sense of the gravity of the situation on the one hand (the loss of an intimate), and the 
 12 
expressive action that is selected as the vehicle of the emotion on the other (the carrying). Let us 
briefly point to some of the considerations that might bear on this question: 
 
 One thing one might want to say is that the act of carrying the coffin exhibits a certain kind of 
tenderness and caring. Indeed, it is pretty much the last chance anyone will have to do anything 
for the departed person. Although of course the person is beyond registering anything about it, 
the act is a highly intimate one. I had never carried my grandfather before. I was aware of 
being in proximity to his body. It seemed important to get him safely to where he was going.
 
 7KHUH¶VDOVRWKHIDFWRIWKLVEHLQJDFHUWDLQMRXUQH\DQGDOVo being, in a powerful metaphor, the 
end of the journey. The whole event revolves around saying farewell to what remains of the 
dead person: it is the last point at which he exists as the object he was. As the last thing to be 
done for him it felt in the end important that he should be carried by the family and not just by 
people who we were paying to run the service. 
 
 There is also something about the importance of taking responsibility - shouldering 
responsibility - and being able to deal with this physically demanding task at a time of 
emotional strain. Self-mastery is required for the action, since a faltering step, or a loss of self-
control, can lead to disaster. In shouldering the burden one takes on the all-important role of 
guiding the person to their final destination, and shows one can live up to it. The act of 
physically carrying someone in this desperate situation is an embodiment of taking 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\GLVSOD\LQJRQH¶VRZQJUDYLW\DQGVWUHQJWK6 
 
                                                 
6
 This feature is potentially troubling in its relation to conceptions of masculinity and femininity. It is no accident, of 
course, that, in the culture from which this example is drawn, only men carry the coffin. This is not because of 
physical strength. It is rather a matter of social role. It has to do with the aspects of self-control and strength, being 
able to keep onH¶VHPRWLRQVLQFKHFN. And this makes the ritual problematic if one rejects those aspects of 
masculinity. Actions like that of carrying the coffin derive their meaning, and rely for their power, on a network of 
other meanings. In a society where conceptions of gender roles are problematic, it is likely to be particularly difficult 
to find expressive actions that have no connection with those roles. ,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWWKLVPHDQVZHVKRXOGDEDQGRQ
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I think that these are examples of the kind of considerations that might commonly go into 
deliberation on a question like the one I have posed. They are considerations of a type that 
intelligent moral agents in our culture do sometimes, perhaps often, deploy as elements of 
deliberation, and offer as aspects of justification. They are considerations that bear on the 
question of whether an action is an appropriate vehicle for an emotion. In asking whether the 
action is the appropriate vehicle for the emotion, we have to look at how things look to the 
person experiencing that emotion. I take it that an emotion has perceptual aspects, that it presents 
situations to an agent in a distinctive way, such that an agent attends to (or finds absorbing or 
compelling) certain features rather than others, that she sees those features under a certain 
characterisation, and that this characterisation brings the evaluative features picked out together 
according to a certain internal logic or narrative: we might call all this the intentional object of 
the emotion (the emotion is directed at the object under a certain characterisation: Cf. Rorty 
1980; de Sousa 1980; Roberts 1988; Green, this volume, makes a similar claim in discussing 
metaphor). An emotion therefore brings with it a sense of the way in which the situation matters. 
What it means, on this account, for something to be an appropriate vehicle for an emotion is for 
it to in some way capture or reflect or do justice to our sense of what matters about the situation 
(or, those key things that are made compelling by the grip of the emotion) ± for it to be fitting to 
the intentional content of the emotional state.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
expressive acts altogether. But it is likely that many such acts, and the attitudes associated with them, are deeply 
embedded in our sense of the appropriateness of forms of expression. We may seek to create new vehicles for 
expression that are more equitable. The problem with this is that such vehicles require depth and resonance, and it 
can be hard for us to see newly coined acts as capturing what it is they want to capture: they wear their arbitrariness 
on their face. Hence it may be important to attempt to adapt the older forms as particular elements come to lack the 
power they presumably once had. Perhaps the carrying of the coffin would be more powerful if it were done by male 
and female alike.  
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A question now arises about what it means to do justice to the intentional object of the emotion. 
7KHZD\,ZDQWWRSKUDVHWKLVTXHVWLRQLVµZKDWLVLWIRUan action to have expressive power in 
relation to a certain situation"¶:HFDQPDNHVRPHSURJUHVVRQWKLVTXHVWLRQE\ORRNLQJEULHIO\DW
one contribution to the debate in aesthetics about expressive qualities of artworks. We might 
think that debates in aesthetics are an obvious place to look for an understanding of the notion of 
expression of emotion. However, aestheticians have long since learned to distinguish expressions 
of emotion, on the one hand, from expressive qualities on the other, and to point out, in criticism 
of the Romantic view of art as the expression of emotion, that artworks may possess the latter 
without consisting in the former (Hospers 1954-5). We might nevertheless think that expressive 
qualities and expressions of emotion are in some way linked. However, insofar as this idea is 
pursued, there is some tendency in the modern debate about expressive qualities to see such 
TXDOLWLHVDVUHIOHFWLYHRIWKHµQDWXUDOH[SUHVVLRQV¶RIHPRWLRQ (Kivy 1989; Davies 1980) ± as 
though these latter were themselves self-explanatory. I think, therefore, that we need to look 
HOVHZKHUHLIZHZDQWWRNQRZZKDWLWLVIRUVRPHWKLQJWREHDQDSSURSULDWHYHKLFOHRUµQDWXUDO¶
expression of an emotion in the first place. The view I am interested in is almost the opposite of 
this tendency: it will seek to explain the fact that some behaviour can intelligibly be the vehicle 
IRUWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIDQHPRWLRQWKURXJKDQH[SODQDWLRQRIWKDWEHKDYLRXU¶VH[SUHVVLYHSRZHU± 
ZKHUHKDYLQJµH[SUHVVLYHSRZHU¶GRHVQRWMXVWPHDQWKat this is the behaviour we have an 
observable tendency to engage in when in these emotional states.  
 
4. Expressive acts, expressive power and symbolism 
µExpression¶ can mean a number of different things in philosophy. For instance, a sentence in 
English might be said to express a (timeless) proposition; utterances, even fact-stating ones, 
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might be said to express our attitudes; moral language might be said to express our convictions 
rather than stating facts; behaviour might be said to express emotion; music might be said to 
express emotion; a person might be said to be expressing himself through certain actions or 
creations; art, music and poetry might be said to have expressive power. There is clearly a 
question about whether all these uses have anything important in common (Green 2007: 21-2). 
But that is not my question in this paper.  
 
I would like to concentrate at this point on the last of these senses of µexpression¶ ± the sense of 
expressive power. I want to start with an intuition that we might have about some artworks: that 
they are a vehicle for which we might reach because we feel that they do justice to our sense of 
how things are in a way that more prosaic and literal media cannot. I would like to suggest that 
these are artworks that have expressive power by virtue of their success in capturing or doing 
justice to our sense of how things are (in some respect). If there is anything right about this 
thought about expressive artworks then we might say that they are created for their own sake in 
the sense that they seek to represent rather than to change the world: they have a world-to-mind 
rather than mind-to-world direction of fit. I further want to suggest that we might think of 
expressive actions in the same way: that they are actions that we reach for in order to do justice 
to the (perhaps in some way extraordinary) significance of a situation, but where there is no 
further purpose to be attained than reflecting how things are. In the case of both artwork and 
action, I will suggest, this reflecting or capturing or doing justice can only be carried out through 
the adequate symbolisation of the target. 
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One good starting point is a distinction between two meanings of µexpression¶ that is drawn by 
Richard Wollheim in Art and Its Objects.  
 
µIn the first place, and perhaps most primitively, we think of a work of art as expressive 
in the sense in which a gesture or cry would be expressive: that is to say, we conceive it 
as coming so directly and immediately out of some particular emotional or mental state 
that it bears unmistakable marks of that state upon it ... Alongside this notion is another, 
which we apply when we think of an object as expressive of a certain condition because, 
when we are in that condition, it seems to us to match, or correspond with, what we 
experience inwardly: and perhaps when the condition passes, the object is also good for 
reminding us of it in some special poignant way, or for reviving it for us. For an object to 
be expressive in this sense, there is no requirement that it should originate in the 
condition that it expresses, not indeed is there any stipulation about its genesis: for these 
purposes it is simply a piece of the environment which we appropriate on account of the 
way it seems to reiterate something in us. Expression in this sense I shall (following a 
famous nineteenth-century usage) call ³FRUUHVSRQGHQFH´¶ (Wollheim 1970: 47). 
 
2QHZD\WRXQGHUVWDQGWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ:ROOKHLP¶VWZRVHQVHVof expression is to 
distinguish as the symptoms of some mental state, such as crying or smiling, from those objects 
(and, I claim, actions) that possess expressive power because they seem to capture or reflect 
some mental state (or the content thereof). It is the latter in which I am particularly interested, 
since it raises issues of adequacy, appropriateness and inappropriateness that ground normative 
assessment of different forms of expression. 
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:KDW:ROOKHLPKDVLQPLQGLQWKHUDWKHUFU\SWLFUHIHUHQFHWRD³IDPRXVQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\XVDJH
RIµFRUUHVSRQGHQFH¶´XQH[SODLQHGLQKis text) is the tradition of Symbolism in art and poetry that 
we can see as initiated by Baudelaire.7 6SHFLILFDOO\%DXGHODLUH¶VSRHP³&RUUHVSRQGHQFHV´ 
(Baudelaire 1857), which sets out the idea that there are resonant affinities between very 
different types RIREMHFWKDVEHHQFDOOHG³WKHSUHOLPLQDU\PDQLIHVWRRIWKH)UHQFKV\PEROLVW
PRYHPHQW´ (Dorra 1994: 10). In fact, this idea was highly influential in the Romantic and post-
Romantic period, and not just amongst those who prized irrationalism. For instance, it is the 
EDVLVRI0LOO¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQSRHWU\DQGHORTXHQFH 
 
µPoetry and eloquence are both alike the expression or utterance of feeling. But if we may 
be excused the antithesis, we should say that eloquence is heard, poetry overheard. 
EloquenFHVXSSRVHVDQDXGLHQFHWKHSHFXOLDULW\RISRHWU\VHHPVWRXVWROLHLQWKHSRHW¶V
utter unconsciousness of a listener. Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself to itself, in 
moments of solitude, and embodying itself in symbols which are the nearest possible 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHIHHOLQJLQWKHH[DFWVKDSHLQZKLFKLWH[LVWVLQWKHSRHW¶VPLQG
Eloquence is feeling pouring itself out to other minds, courting their sympathy, or 
endeavouring to influence their belief or move them to passion or to action¶0LOO
80).  
 
And, as M. H. Abrams reminds us in his magisterial work on the changes that Romanticism 
brought about in thinking about the nature and value of art, it is also reflecWHGLQ76(OLRW¶V
                                                 
7
 For some discussion of these sources, see (Taylor 1989: Ch. 21). 
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thought that, insofar as a poem is an expressionLWLVEHFDXVHLWVHUYHVDVDQµREMHFWLYH
correlativH¶RIWKHVWDWHRIPLQGRIWKHDUWLVW (Abrams 1953: 25; Eliot 1997). 
 
I think that we can usefully develop the idea that expressive action is symbolic in something like 
this sense. The idea here is that, in performing an expressive action, one seeks to create an 
H[WHUQDOPDQLIHVWDWLRQWKDWFRUUHVSRQGVWRRQH¶VLQQHUVWDWHRUUDWKHUWKHLQWHQWLRQDOFRQWHQWRU
object of that state, the way in which the state presents the situation to the subject), and that one 
GRHVVRVLPSO\LQRUGHUWRUHIOHFWPDUNRUDFNQRZOHGJHRQH¶VVHQVHRIWKHLQVRPHZD\
extraordinary, nature of the situation. The act is a symbol of the situation ± or rather, it is 
expressively powerful insofar as it succeeds as a symbol of the situation ± and the symbol 
PDQDJHVWRFDSWXUHVRPHWKLQJDERXWWKHVLWXDWLRQWKDWFRXOGQ¶WEHFDSWXUHGRWKHUZLVH. One acts 
intentionally in creating the symbol, but the creation of the symbol is its own end in two ways. 
Firstly, the symbol reflects the nature of the situation, and thus moulds itself to the way the world 
appears to be rather than attempting to mould or re-shape the world (world-to-mind rather than 
mind-to-world direction of fit); and secondly, in symbolic action simply to have marked or 
acknowledged the situation is regarded as sufficient goal in its own right. Symbolic action of this 
type succeeds when it reflects the world and does not need to be productive of further good. 
 
It is something like this link between emotion and its expression that Sabine Döring seems to 
have in mind in her response to the debate initiated by Hursthouse. As she puts it: 
 
µExpressive actions are rational insofar as the agent has to distinguish appropriate 
expressions from inappropriate ones. This is particularly important in cases where the 
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action symbolises the representational content of the expressed emotion. Emotions can be 
symbolically expressed because they are representations, and they are often expressed in 
WKLVZD\EHFDXVHWKH\LQFOXGHWKHWDUJHW¶VLPSRUWIRr the subject. In the symbolic case, the 
rationality involved in expressive action consists in grasping the symbolic relations 
between emotional representations and their appropriate expressions¶(Döring 2003: 227) 
 
And Döring continues in a vein conducive to my deployment of Wollheim: 
 
µ7KHPRVWVRSKLVWLFDWHGZD\RIV\PEROLFDOO\H[SUHVVLQJDQHPRWLRQ¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO
FRQWHQWLVDFKLHYHGLQDUW:KDWLVDWVWDNHKHUHLVWKHH[SUHVVLRQ¶VDSSURSULDWHQHVV
and quality as a symbol of the way the world appears to the agent in experiencing the 
emotion. As the exemplary case of artistic expression illustrates, the question whether an 
expression of emotion is rational is a question of mind-to-world fit rather than of world-
to-mind direction of fit¶Döring 2003: 228) 
 
A fuller exploration of what it is for action to be symbolic in this sense will have to wait for 
another occasion. However, we can make some initial observations. First of all, symbolic action 
has to be capable of referring to the situation it is about. It is understood thus by the agent, and 
also by third parties. Hence, despite the fact that expressive action is not performed with the aim 
of communicating, the medium of expressive action must have at least something in common 
with language,8 and we might therefore say that it is apt for communication.9 Secondly, while 
expressive actions tend to follow certain patterns, and often become stereotyped, there is clearly 
                                                 
8
 This is a point stressed by Nelson Goodman in his discussion of expression (Goodman 1976: 45-50).  
9
 Thanks to Catherine Abell for this way of putting it. 
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at least some room for creativity and imagination in coining new forms or developing old ones. 
)RULQVWDQFHWRZDUGVWKHHQGRI:LP:HQGHUV¶VILOPWings of Desire, the two main 
protagonists finally meet in a bar, after a long build-up in which they had gradually become 
awDUHRIHDFKRWKHU¶VH[LVWHQFH± and, somehow, fallen in love ± but had not yet met; they turn to 
one another in a moment of strong attraction and fulfilment; one expects them (stereotypically) 
to kiss; but the female character instead looks at her lover and raises her wine glass in cupped 
hands, in a semi-sacred gesture that somehow captures much more of the tenderness of the 
situation than a kiss would have done. Thirdly, we might think of expressive actions as bearing 
something like a metaphorical relation to the situation they concern. This idea would capture the 
language-like nature of expressive action, as well as the creative and open-ended process of 
devising them. But this pregnant idea needs to be made more precise. For one thing, symbols 
seem to have a higher degree of fittingness and exclusivity to them than the free play of 
metaphors ± for instance, it is at least understandable that I might have felt I had not properly 
paid my respects to my grandfather if I had decided not to engage in this particular symbolic 
action. So there might be something to the Romantic idea that symbols have to achieve a degree 
of organic unity, such that any alteration in a part would destroy the whole.10 For another thing, 
WKHLGHDRIDFWLRQµFRUUHVSRQGLQJ¶WRRQH¶VH[SHULHQFHRIDVLWXDWLRQE\DFWLQJDVDPHWDSKRUIRU
LWGRHVQ¶WLn itself explain the specificity of the symbols that seem to compel our imagination. In 
the funeral case, for instance, we seem to find those actions symbolically important where we act 
                                                 
10
 &I$:6FKOHJHO³,QWKHILQHDUWVWRRDVLQQDWXUHWKDWJUHDWHVWRIDUWLVWVHYHU\JHQXLQHIRUPLVRUJDQLFLH
GHWHUPLQHGE\WKHZRUN¶VFRQWHQW,QVKRUWIRUPLVQRWKLQJRWKHUWKDQ a meaningful exterior, the articulate 
physiognomy of each object, undisturbed by accidental intrusions, and therefore giving faithful testimony to the 
REMHFW¶VKLGGHQHVVHQFH´ (Furst 1980: 94) Two nice stories reflecting this theme are quoted by Aaron Ridley (Ridley 
1995: 49) 7KHILUVWLV0HQGHOVVRKQ¶VFODLP³$SLHFHRIPXVLFZKLFK,ORYHH[SUHVVHVWKRXJKWVWRPHZKLFKQRWWRR
imprecise to be framed in words, but too precise. So I find that attempts to express such thoughts in words may have 
some point to them, EXWWKH\DUHDOVRXQVDWLVI\LQJ´$QGWKHVHFRQGFRQFHUQV6FKXPDQQ¶VUHVSRQVHWREHLQJDVNHG
ZKDWWKHSLHFHRIPXVLFKHKDGMXVWSOD\HGH[SUHVVHG³KHVDWEDFNGRZQDWWKHSLDQRDQGSOD\HGWKHSLHFHDJDLQ
VD\LQJµ7KDW¶´ 
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as though we could still look after the departed. Appeal to metaphor does not explain why this 
particular metaphor is important. Why is just that the kind of thing we want to say about this 
situation? (Though we should also be aware that there might be little in the way of generalisation 
to say in answer to this question.) 
 
On the assumption that what I have said so far has succeeded in making the line of thought to be 
pursued intelligible and at least somewhat attractive, I would like to now turn to how this 
account might be deployed in addressing the puzzle of expressive acts with which we started. 
First of all, I would like to point out that the line I have pursued here is not the only way of 
rationalising behaviour out of emotion ± and I will situate it amongst some other strategies. 
Secondly, I will argue for my view by rHWXUQLQJWRVRPHRI+XUVWKRXVH¶VH[DPSOHVDQGVKRZLQJ
how they can be seen as performed for the kind of reasons of expressive power that we have 
canvassed in this section. 
 
5. Explaining action out of emotion 
First of all, I admit that, even if the story told here succeeds in its explanation of expressive 
action as rational action, guided by reasons, we should acknowledge that this is not the only way 
in which this action out of emotion might be revealed as rational. For instance, in Jean 
+DPSWRQ¶VUHPDUNDEle analyses of resentment, malice and spite, she argues that action from 
emotion has at least the appearance of straightforward means-end rationality given the beliefs or 
perceptions that the person in the grip of the emotion is subject to (Hampton 1988). The spiteful 
SHUVRQRQ+DPSWRQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJVHHVKLPVHOIDVKDYLQJEHHQVXEMXJDWHGLQVRPHUHVSHFW± 
lowered in the pecking order ± and takes aim at those he sees as better off to bring them down to 
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his own level, thereby to assuage his own sense of inferiority by giving him company, as he sees 
it, DWWKHERWWRP1RZ+DPSWRQ¶VQXDQFHGDQDO\VLVLVFRPSOLFDWHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWVKHDUJXHV
firstly, that this emotional strategy is in fact self-GHIHDWLQJEHFDXVHLWGRHVQ¶WLQIDFWKHOSWKH
person who takes himself to be at the bottom to have others at the bottom with him ± since he is 
still at the bottom; and secondly, that the way of thinking that generates this strategy is 
fundamentally flawed because based on a competitive Hobbesian view of basic human worth 
rather than a non-competitive Kantian one. Nevertheless, we can see Hampton as presenting us 
with a way of seeing emotional behaviour as instrumentally rational given goals that make sense 
to the person thinking about things through the lens of a given emotion. 
 
Alternatively, we might follow Sartre in seeing action out of emotion, not as straightforwardly 
VWUDWHJLFEXWUDWKHUDVVWUDWHJLFJLYHQVRPHµPDJLFDOWKLQNLQJ¶± so for instance the angry person 
lashes out because she thinks ± WKRXJKRQO\µPDJLFDOO\¶± that in doing so she can destroy that 
wealth of overwhelming demands that she cannot otherwise satisfy (Sartre 1962). One way of 
LQWHUSUHWLQJWKLVLVWRWDNH3HWHU*ROGLH¶VSRVLWLRQDQGWRVD\WKDWWKHPDJLFDOWKLQNLQJMXVWPHDQV
that the person acts as she wishes she was able to act in the situation ± that the behaviour exhibits 
a wish or a desire that runs deep but which cannot be allowed to surface given the shackles of 
civilisation (Goldie 2000). On this type of view, behaviour out of emotion can be seen as means-
end rational once we appreciate that the µends¶LQTXHVWLRQDUHSURYLGHd by certain suppressed 
desires that the strains of involvement bring to the surface. 
 
Finally, we might take the view that emotional behaviour is prudential even though its prudence 
is not what motivates the agent, or need be transparent to the agent at all. This is the view that 
  
23 
behaviour out of emotion is adaptive ± or at any rate was adaptive at that time in our 
evolutionary history when the basic hard-wiring of human psychology was being laid down 
(Prinz 2004). Taking the case of fear as a model, for instance, it might be said that this emotion is 
triggered by typical situations that may or may not themselves represent danger, and that the 
person who is afraid, in responding to the fearful, need not necessarily be aware of the fearful as 
GDQJHURXVEXWWKDWLWLVQHYHUWKHOHVVLQWKHDJHQW¶VLQWHUHVWVWRKDYHWKLVVKRUW-cut mechanism of 
responding to the fearful, because in that way the agent is likely to be better kept away from 
danger. 
 
These are at least some of the alternatives for explaining behaviour out of emotion as rational. In 
putting forward my own account of emotional behaviour as seeking to do justice by symbolising 
the sense of the situation, I need not thereby be claiming that it is incompatible with these 
alternatives. One possibility is that my account might be a good explanation of some types of 
behaviour out of emotion, while the alternatives better explain others ± for instance, I find 
+DPSWRQ¶Vaccount of spite pretty compelling; furthermore attempting to explain fear-behaviour 
in terms of µGRLQJMXVWLFH¶WRWKHVLWXDWLRQGRHVQ¶WVHHPYHU\SODXVLEOH. What my account 
attempts to explain is a sub-set of behaviour out of emotion: that which LVµH[SUHVVLYH¶LQWKH
sense of being apparently not carried out for any further end, and which rather has as its end 
marking or acknowledging the significance of the situation in which the agent finds themselves. 
As the funeral example suggests, sometimes the best explanation of our action is that such action 
represents the fitting expressive vehicle, in this sense, for our charged sense of the situation. If 
some emotions, such as grief, pride, guilt, shame, joy, affection, admiration and respect, but 
unlike fear, DUHDNLQWRµMXGJHPHQWVRIYDOXH¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\DUHWLHGWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
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sense of what is important ± specifically that they PDNHVRPHHYHQWVLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VOLIH
resonate through her consciousness rather than slipping away in the endless stream of one thing 
after another ± we will distort our understanding of the behaviour to which they lead if we 
attempt to fit them in to the strategic model of fear.  
 
The funeral case provides an example of an expressive action about which one might deliberate 
DQGUHJDUGLQJZKLFKRQHPLJKWHQGXSZLWKVRPHVHQVHRIZKHWKHURQHKDGµJRWLWULJKW¶LQ
acting as one did. The example was chosen precisely in order to display the kind of thinking that 
might go on about the appropriateness of the symbolic, expressive qualities of the action. 
+XUVWKRXVH¶Vview is that expressions are actions but not done with a purpose. My point is that 
this overlooks an important way in which behaviour can relate to inner states. This relation is 
taken up when we talk of our giving expression to certain emotions. In giving expression to an 
emotion we select some form of expression rather than another as being in some way fitting or 
satisfying. So my response is that expressive acts are done with a purpose, and that that purpose 
is, as with the funeral case, to mark or acknowledge or do justice to some extraordinary turn of 
events, or some extraordinary feature of our situation. :HGRWKDWE\FUHDWLQJRUµFRLQLQJ¶DQ
action of expressive power. However, the act of acknowledging or marking is not done for some 
further purpose. And this, I claim, is what gives rise to the impression that expressive acts are a 
distinctive category ± that they cannot be done as a means to a further end.  
 
Nevertheless, it is natural to think that there is a gap between the funeral case and the 
spontaneous expressions of emotion Hursthouse mentions. In the latter case, there may be no 
prior deliberation or planning or selection; indeed, the actions may be done in the presence of 
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strong emotion that might make at least some types of clear thought difficult ± though as Raz 
points out, sometimes strong emotion brings with it a high degree of self-control rather than a 
weakening: Raz 1999: 39). However, I doubt that this is a definitive reason to reject my account. 
Many actions are habitual and spontaneous but nevertheless reason-guided: many actions are 
intentional, or exhibit what Searle calls intention in action, without being preceded by any prior 
formation of an intention (Searle 1983); and intentions in actLRQFDQEHJXLGHGE\DQDJHQW¶V
sense of what counts in favour of the relevant actions. ,GRQ¶WKDYHDIXOO-blown account of 
habitual rational action to unveil in this paper. But I will now give a slightly more detailed 
defence of the application of the funeral model to spontaneous expression of emotion.  
 
Recall that the guiding thought, on my account, is that this action is carried out to give form to, 
DQGGRMXVWLFHWRWKHSHUVRQ¶VVHQVHRIWKHVLWXDWLRQDVLWLVSUHVHQWHGE\WKHHPRWLRQWKH\DUHLQ
the grip of. To make my account plausible, we would have to be able a) to see this action as a 
VXLWDEOHYHKLFOHWRGRMXVWLFHWRWKHZD\RQHVHHVRQH¶VVLWXDWLRQLQDILWRIMHDORXVUDJHDQGEWR
see the motivation of the expressive action as simply that oIPDUNLQJWKHSHUVRQ¶VXUJHQWVHQVHRI
WKHVLWXDWLRQ/HW¶VWDNHDILUVW 
 
Take gouging out the eyes to start with. We should note first of all that the eyes are clearly not an 
arbitrary target. It is a picture, not just of any person, but of the rival in particular. The action 
taken is not simply that of crumpling the picture up, but rather is directed at the eyes. The eyes 
are not just the windows of the soul, but also, perhaps, something without which the rival could 
not have her beauty ± so there is an element, not simply of maiming, but of disfiguring. Perhaps 
the rival is to be disfigured in order to make it more likely that the object of your affections will 
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choose you; or perhaps, that possibility already lost, it is in order to ensure that she is brought 
GRZQWRRQH¶VRZQPLVHUDEOHOHYHO,QKLVUHDGLQJRIWKLVH[DPSOH3HWHU*ROGLHVXJJHVWVWKDWZH
are acting out suppressed desires, desires transformed by their suppression on to the next most 
suitable object (Goldie 2000); but it seems unnecessary to ascribe to someone who engages in 
this action the genuine desire to do this to their rival. It would be enough if we could explain 
what makes the gouging of the eyes resonant and powerful for the person in the grip of jealousy 
as an externalisation of their complex emotional attitude: it would not follow that jealousy 
involved a genuine but suppressed desire to do it for real.  
 
,IZHQRZWXUQWRWKHFDVHRIUXIIOLQJWKHFKLOG¶VKDLUZHcan see to start with that this is an 
action that one would only take to someone smaller, more junior, someone on whom one looks 
down ± it is precisely the action of affectionately looking down. Placing the hand on the head in 
that way, caressing it, is a good way of capturing this attitude. It is also a well-meant invasion of 
personal space ± ruffling the hair of an adult and stranger is a moderately serious breach of rules 
RISHUVRQDOGLVWDQFHDQGUHVSHFW6R\RXRQO\UXIIOHWKHKDLURIVRPHRQHZKRVHVWDWXVGRHVQ¶W
preclude that kind of physical closeness. With these brief remarks we can perhaps start to see 
how the action might be intelligibly related to the complex intentional content of the emotion.  
 
Finally, if we take the examples of jumping for joy, puffing oneself up with pride; and contrast 
them with the slumping behaviour we associated with grief or dejection. There is an important 
pattern of µup¶ and µdown¶ here that seems to have resonance as a metaphor rather than a mere 
regularity in behaviour. µUp¶ is the position of power and activity, of readiness, of open 
possibility; µdown¶ is its opposite, of resignation, passivity, inactivity. This is the symbolism that 
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we might see as underpinning our sense that such behaviour is, not just common, but appropriate. 
These are the reasons that might be seen as informing and guiding these expressive actions, 
actions through which we give form to the emotional state rather than merely manifesting it as a 
symptom. 
 
In giving these examples, I am trying to show that expressive behaviour even in the spontaneous 
case is susceptiEOHRIDµUHDGLQJ¶WKDWPLJKWVKRZZK\LWwould be appropriate to select it as a 
fitting vehicle for that emotion if, as we were in the case of the funeral, one is in the business of 
GHOLEHUDWLYHO\VHOHFWLQJDYHKLFOHIRURQH¶VHPRWLRQ 
 
If we turn to b) now, and ask whether it is plausible to think, in each of these cases, that the 
motivation for the action is not to bring about any further envisaged good beyond, as Wollheim 
says, the production of (in this case) an action in which one can recognise and see externalised 
WKHFRQWHQWRIRQH¶VRZQDWWLWXGH± what are we to say? The view I have developed here is 
plausible if the view of emotions on which it rests is plausible. Some emotions, I have claimed, 
are tied to our sense of the importance of things, making it the case that what has importance 
stands out, for its own sake. Marking our deep sense of things brings it about that these fleeting 
episodes resonate in our consciousness and take on a life more enduring than the mundane. The 
way the child strikes you at that moment, in its combination of sturdiness and fragility, makes 
you feel both lucky in the moment and already nostalgic for what will pass; the fact that things 
are going so exceptionally well gives you a sense of well-being and benevolent power such that 
DOOWKLQJVVHHPSRVVLEOHWKHFRQVWDQWQDJJLQJWKRXJKWRIWKHULYDO¶VVXSUHPDF\DQGLQFUXFLDO
respects, superiority. These emotions reflect, extend and animate our sense of what is important 
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in what goes on; the fact that the behaviour that expresses such emotions also has the role of 
marking that sense and making it resonate in the external is simply part of the same role. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have suggested a way to solve the apparent puzzle that Hursthouse sets about 
µDrational actLRQV¶+XUVWKRXVH worries that there are actions that are intentional but not done for 
any reason, and which therefore have to be explained as hDYLQJEHHQGRQHµRXWRIHPRWLRQ¶ 
rather than for a purpose. My claim is that this conclusion relies on too narrow a view of the 
reasons for which actions can be performed. Many such actions, I claim, can be thought of as 
habitual and spontaneous versions of more deliberated actions such as that which I provide in my 
example of the funeral, acts that are carried out in some sense for their own sake, in order to 
honour or do justice to the gravity of the situation. More broadly, this response to Hursthouse 
raises questions about the relation between emotions and the action that expresses them. I have 
argued that the role of some emotions is to provide an individual with a sense of the 
extraordinary importance of certain events in their life, making those events stand out from the 
manifold, and that the behaviour that expresses those emotions can be seen as contributing to that 
role. I have claimed that behavioural expressions of such emotions require a dimension of 
expressive adequacy, even expressive power, and I suggest symbolism as a way of thinking 
about where such expressive power is to be found. The present investigation leaves many 
questions about this view unanswered. But I hope to have made a start on sketching the basis on 
which a neglected alternative in the literature on emotion and its expression could be defended.11  
                                                 
11
 This paper has been presented to audiences at Sheffield, Leeds and Tübingen, and to a workshop on emotion and 
expression organized by Catherine Abell and Joel Smith in Manchester. I would like to thank those who asked 
questions at these events. A number of people have also discussed the key ideas with me, and some have provided 
detailed comments on previous drafts. I am very grateful for their input. In particular I am grateful to Sabine Döring, 
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Joel Smith, Catherine Abell, Dorothea Debus, Kim Brownlee, Daniel Schwartz, Angie Smith, Rob Hopkins, 
Yonatan Shemmer, Natasha McKeever, Carl Fox, George Botterill, Jenny Saul, David Owens, Carolyn Price, Julian 
Dodd, Steven Davies, Gerald Lang, Ulrike Heuer, Matthew Noah Smith, Andrew McGonigal, Chris Megone, 
Bahadir Eker and Bill Wringe.   
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